Sunday, October 28, 2018

Saving Primary Care Before It’s Too Late

Talk to almost any primary care physician these days and what you’ll hear should frighten you. Many PCPs are actively looking for ways to get out of primary care, and there’s no one to replace them because medical students don’t want to go into primary care. One well-known reason for this is that PCPs are being forced to spend more time dealing with the administrative burdens of dysfunctional EHRs, measurement programs, and health plan rules than taking care of patients.

But there’s another reason that nobody is talking about, and it may be an even bigger threat to the future of primary care.

The Hidden Flaw in “Value-Based Payment” Programs

Health plans and public programs simply aren’t paying enough to cover the costs of good primary care. Payments to PCPs from both Medicare and private payers have fallen far behind inflation, and so-called “value-based payments” do more harm than good when the payments aren’t enough to keep the lights on. Large health systems can afford to subsidize these losses, but independent primary care physicians can’t. They will simply be forced out of business, and that will be devastating for many small and rural communities.

You know it’s bad when primary care practices have to ask for donations in order to keep treating patients. The residents of Hilo, Hawaii created a fundraising site to try and prevent a young primary care physician and her practice from going bankrupt because of the low payments from the big health insurance company in Hawaii. You can see the plea for support here:
https://www.gofundme.com/hilo-clinic-in-crisis

This young physician – Michelle Mitchell – has worked hard to create the kind of primary care practice we need everywhere in America. And she’s trying to do it in a small rural community with many poor people and a severe physician shortage. Hilo is not the wealthy “resort” part of Hawaii; on top of problems of poverty, homelessness, and unemployment, it’s been in the news over the past year because it has an active volcano destroying homes and polluting the air, and it was hit with a severe hurricane. It’s the kind of place where health plans should be doing everything in their power not only to keep primary care practices open but to provide extra support so they can deliver true primary care medical home services to their patients. But unfortunately, that’s not happening. You can read Dr. Mitchell’s story here:
http://hawaiifamilyhealth.com/family-health-blog/

There’s an important lesson here for many current “value-based payment” initiatives. Rather than working with the physicians in the community to figure out what kind of payment system would actually support good primary care in rural communities, the health insurance company in Hawaii hired a group of behavioral economics theorists at a large urban medical center to tell them how PCPs should be paid. They published a journal article touting how they designed incentives to achieve savings for the health plan and incentives to improve quality.

But it’s clear from the article that the consultants and health plan never even tried to answer a very fundamental question – what does it actually cost to deliver good primary care in Hawaii and would the payment system they designed cover those costs? You can’t “incentivize” a PCP to deliver higher-value care if the PCP is no longer practicing at all because they defaulted on their loans or mortgage or failed to make payroll.

How should the payment system have been designed to support small rural practices? Dr. Mitchell gave her recommendations at the National ACO, Bundled Payment, and MACRA Summit in Washington DC in June. She described her experience participating in both the CMS Comprehensive Primary Care Plus program and the payment system in Hawaii, and she showed how those programs increased her costs and failed to provide enough revenue to cover the costs, leaving her practice worse off financially than it was before. You can see her recommendations for what is needed to make high-quality primary care sustainable here.

Saving Primary Care Before It’s Gone

There’s been a lot of talk for many years about the need to improve payment for primary care practices, but there hasn’t been much action, particularly at the federal level. Medicare still doesn’t have a primary care medical home program available for PCPs in most of the country. The CMS Comprehensive Primary Care Plus initiative is only operating in 18 regions of the country, and even in those regions, only a subset of PCPs are able to participate. Primary care practices in Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming and in most of Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, New York, and Pennsylvania are still stuck in the traditional Medicare fee for service payment system.

In December 2017, the Physician-Focused Payment Model Technical Advisory Committee (PTAC) recommended that the Secretary of Health and Human Services begin testing a new primary care payment model recommended by the American Academy of Family Physicians so that more primary care physicians would have the opportunity to be paid in better ways. PTAC specifically recommended that the AAFP model be tested in a way that would “facilitate rapid implementation on a broad scale,” and it emphasized the urgent need to preserve and strengthen primary care.

Ten months has now passed since PTAC recommended a new primary care payment model, and nothing has happened.

Rather than waiting years for CMS to design the “perfect” payment model and then waiting many more years while it’s tried in a small number of places, it’s time for a different approach. CMS and other payers should:

  • Try multiple payment models so we can learn which approaches work better in which places. It’s unlikely there will ever be a one-size-fits-all model that will work well in every community and every type of practice, so we should stop trying to develop one ideal model.
  • Let the physicians design the payment models in ways they believe will work. The current top-down, payer-driven approach to alternative payment models hasn’t succeeded in improving quality or reducing costs, so it’s time to try a bottom-up approach instead. Physicians have shown they will respond if they are given the opportunity. For example, Jean Antonucci, MD, a solo primary care physician in a rural part of Maine, developed an innovative primary care payment model that is simpler than other approaches and that uses patient-reported outcomes to measure quality and stratify payments. PTAC reviewed her proposal in September and recommended that CMS test it in addition to the proposal developed by the AAFP.
  • Move quickly to try new approaches. Every day that goes by waiting for the ideal model to be developed is a day that a patient may not get the care they need and a day that a primary care practice comes closer to closing.

Although we’re spending too much overall on health care, we’re spending too little on primary care – estimates indicate that primary care represents less than 8% of total healthcare spending. If we don’t invest in better primary care, we’re not likely to be successful in reducing the 92% of spending where the opportunities for savings exist. The net cost of a 25% increase in payments to PCPs is zero if the reductions in avoidable hospitalizations and unnecessary tests and procedures from better primary care reduces other spending by a mere 2%.

The question is not whether we can afford to improve primary care, but whether we can afford not to. Will there be any primary care practices left by the time we finally decide to pay them the right way?

 

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Thursday, August 30, 2018

Was the Medicare Shared Savings Program Successful in 2017?

CMS released the 2017 results for the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) on August 30, 2018. Here is what they show:

  • The 472 Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) in the MSSP spent nearly $1.1 billion less than their “benchmark” spending levels (the amounts CMS projected that it would spend on the ACOs’ patients in the absence of ACO actions).
  • CMS gave $799 million of the savings back to 162 of the ACOs in shared savings bonuses. 16 Track 2 & 3 ACOs paid penalties to CMS totaling $57 million.
  • The net result was that CMS saved $313.7 million on the MSSP.

Is $313.7 million a lot of savings? Hardly:

  • The savings amounted to only $36 for each of the nearly 9 million beneficiaries in the ACO program – that’s what the ACOs would save if half of their patients made one fewer visit to the doctor each year.
  • The savings amounted to only 0.33% of the total spending of $95 billion in the 472 ACOs – one-third of one percent.
  • The $314 million in net savings combined with the total of $384 in net losses in the first four years of the program means that CMS has yet to generate a net benefit for the Medicare program after five years of trying.

Did the ACOs that took downside risk produce more savings? No, they actually saved less:

  • The 39 “downside risk” ACOs only saved an average of $27 per beneficiary (0.24%).
  • The 433 “upside-only” ACOs saved $37 per beneficiary (0.34%).
  • The upside only ACOs saved 36% more per beneficiary than the two-sided risk ACOs.
  • Only 59% of the downside risk ACOs reduced Medicare spending, and 60% of the upside-only ACOs reduced Medicare spending. 41% of the downside risk ACOs actually increased Medicare spending.
  • The downside risk ACOs spent $254 more in total per beneficiary ($10,933) than the upside-only ACOs did ($10,679) even after they “saved” money for Medicare.
  • Although the MSSP program didn’t save very much overall, 93% of the savings came from the upside only Track 1 ACOs.

The experience in 2017 indicates that forcing all ACOs to take downside risk would likely produce even less Medicare savings, not more. The path to savings isn’t more risk, but a completely different approach. How to Fix the Medicare Shared Savings Program explains why shared savings, shared risk, and other risk-based population payment systems are unlikely to ever result in significant savings for the Medicare program, and it describes the kind of patient-centered payment system that CMS and other payers should be pursuing instead.

 

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Monday, March 19, 2018

How to Create More Successful Alternative Payment Models More Quickly

There is broad consensus that the fee-for-service payment systems currently used in Medicare create significant barriers to delivering higher-quality care to Medicare beneficiaries at a more affordable cost. There is also growing concern that rather than solving the problems with fee-for-service payments, Medicare’s pay-for-performance programs are making things worse. Properly-designed Alternative Payment Models (APMs) are needed to solve the problems with both current fee-for-service payment systems and pay-for-performance programs.

Problems With CMS’s Current Approach to Creating Alternative Payment Models

In 2010, Congress created the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI) and provided it with $10 billion in funding over a ten year period in order to create Alternative Payment Models. However, after more than seven years and more than $5 billion in spending, only six payment models created by CMMI meet the APM requirements established by Congress, and only one of the models tested by CMMI has been expanded nationally. The slow progress in implementing successful Alternative Payment Models means that each year, millions of Medicare beneficiaries are being denied the opportunity to receive higher-quality care and the Medicare program is spending billions of dollars more than is necessary.

The lack of progress is due to several problems with the approach CMMI has used for developing and testing Alternative Payment Models:

1.   Most of the Models Being Tested Don’t Solve the Problems with Fee-for-Service Payment

Most of the large Alternative Payment Models created by CMMI – the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement (BPCI) model, the Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement Model, the Comprehensive ESRD Model, the NextGen ACO Model, and the Pioneer ACO Model – follow the same basic formula:

  • No changes are made in the current fee for service structure. In most CMMI APMs, physicians, hospitals, and other providers continue to be paid under standard Medicare payment systems. No additional payments are made for any additional services, even if those additional services would be necessary or highly desirable in improving patient care and reducing avoidable spending.
  • Additional payments are dependent on achieving “shared savings.” A year or more after services are delivered, the physicians, hospitals, or other providers in the APM may receive an additional payment (or be required to repay some of the payments they have already received) based on whether CMS determines that it spent less than it otherwise would have. This approach is essentially the same as CMS’s pay-for-performance programs, except that the bonuses and penalties are proportional to the amount of money saved. This means that providers who already have high levels of performance receive no additional resources to sustain their operations, while providers who have had high rates of complications or who have overused expensive services can receive large bonuses for addressing those problems.

Adding “shared savings” on top of the current fee-for-service payment system does not solve the barriers in the current payment system, since participating providers may or may not receive adequate or timely funding to support new high-value services that would benefit their patients. An even greater concern is that a shared savings program can financially reward a healthcare provider for failing to order or deliver a costly service that a patient needs, since the provider could receive a portion of the savings when fewer services are delivered.

Moreover, the shared savings payment approach is already being used extensively for Accountable Care Organizations as part of the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP). Rather than trying to find significantly different approaches to Alternative Payment Models, CMMI has focused a large portion of its resources on developing and testing variations on the MSSP model. In fact, during the first six years of CMMI’s existence, it spent over $600 million on four different variations on the MSSP ACO model (Pioneer ACOs, NextGen ACOs, the ACO Investment Model, and the Advance Payment ACO model).

Only two current CMMI Alternative Payment Models – the Comprehensive Primary Care Plus Model and the Oncology Care Model – provide significant new, upfront payments that are specifically designed to address barriers in the current fee-for-service payment system. However, continued payments under the Oncology Care Model are contingent on the oncology practice achieving savings. Even though CMMI tried using the shared savings model in the Comprehensive Primary Care Initiative and concluded that it was not an effective mechanism of paying physician practices, it proceeded to use a similar approach to pay oncology practices as part of the Oncology Care Model.

2.   Too Few Physician-Focused Payment Models Are Being Tested

Not only do the APMs developed by CMMI fail to solve the problems with fee-for-service payment and create potentially problematic incentives to stint on care, most are designed in one or more ways that make it difficult for physician practices, particularly small physician practices and single-specialty practices, to participate.

  • No upfront payments for new or enhanced services. Although upside-only shared savings models are commonly portrayed as “risk-free” for providers, the fact is that if the providers want to change the way they deliver care, they incur significant financial risk, since they have to pay for any new or enhanced services themselves and then hope that they will qualify for a large enough shared savings payment to cover those unreimbursed costs. This is particularly difficult for small physician practices and hospitals.
  • Eligibility limited to hospitalized patients, patients receiving expensive procedures, and complex patients. Most of the CMMI models developed to date have focused on reducing spending after a patient has already been hospitalized (e.g., the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement initiative), reducing spending on patients who are receiving expensive outpatient procedures (e.g., the Oncology Care Model for chemotherapy and the Comprehensive ESRD Care model for dialysis), and reducing spending on complex patients with multiple health problems (e.g., Accountable Care Organizations). These models ignore the many opportunities that exist to reduce spending by preventing hospitalizations, using lower-cost alternatives to expensive procedures, and preventing the development and progression of chronic diseases. Moreover, by limiting alternative payment models to patients who receive expensive procedures, the CMMI models could unintentionally encourage delivery of unnecessary procedures.
  • Participation restricted to hospitals. Even though physician practices have been successful in managing bundled episode payments for orthopedic and cardiac procedures in the private sector and in the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement initiative, CMMI has only permitted hospitals to participate in the Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement (CJR) program, and the proposed CMMI Episode Payment program for cardiac procedures would have been open only to hospitals.
  • Requirements for large numbers of patients. In many of its models, the minimum number of patients CMMI requires for participation is much higher than the number of patients that small physician practices care for.
  • Financial penalties for providers based on things they cannot control. In most CMMI payment models, participating providers are rewarded or penalized based on whether the total Medicare spending on their patients is lower than expected, even if the providers have no ability to control or even influence all of the services their patients receive. For example, in the Oncology Care Model, oncologists could be penalized for increases in spending due to increases in drug prices, treatments for injuries the patients receive in car accidents, or complications of treatment delivered by other physicians for health issues unrelated to their cancer, even though the oncologists could not reasonably be expected to control or even influence many of these cost drivers.
  • Failure to risk adjust spending and quality measures based on clinical characteristics of patients that affect costs and outcomes. A physician, hospital, or other healthcare provider can significantly influence the cost and quality of care through the decisions they make about how to treat patients and the way they deliver treatments, but they cannot control how sick or frail the patients who come to them for treatment are. The risk adjustment systems used in CMMI APMs fail to recognize many of the key patient characteristics that affect costs and outcomes, which means that providers who care for sicker or higher-risk patients can face financial penalties, which in turn could make it more difficult for such patients to obtain the care they need.

Despite the fact that most of the healthcare services received by Medicare beneficiaries are delivered by non-primary care specialists, the CMMI Alternative Payment Model portfolio is almost devoid of models specifically designed for such specialists. In 2014, CMMI issued a Request for Information asking for input on the creation of specialty-specific payment models , and it convened several Technical Expert Panels to explore payment models in specialties such as cardiology, gastroenterology, neurology, and oncology. However, in the three years since then, CMMI has implemented only one APM – the Oncology Care Model — that was specifically designed for participation by small, non-primary care specialty physician practices.

In 2015, Congress recognized that CMMI had done too little to create Alternative Payment Models that were specifically designed for physicians. In the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA), it specifically encouraged the development of physician-focused payment models (PFPMs) by:

  • requiring the Secretary of Health and Human Services to establish criteria for PFPMs, including models for specialist physicians;
  • authorizing individuals and stakeholder entities to submit proposals for PFPMs that meet these criteria;
  • creating the Physician-Focused Payment Model Technical Advisory Committee (PTAC) to review these proposals and to prepare comments and recommendations to the Secretary regarding whether the proposals meet the criteria; and
  • requiring the Secretary of Health and Human Services to publicly post a detailed response to the PTAC’s comments and recommendations.

In its initial year of operation, PTAC received dozens of proposals for physician-focused payment models, and in April 2017, only four months after receiving the initial proposals, the PTAC recommended two payment models for limited-scale testing. These payment models would have enabled a wide range of specialists to participate in APMs that would improve care for a much broader range of patients than CMMI models. Unfortunately, in the Secretary of HHS’s response to PTAC, CMMI indicated it was not willing to implement the models PTAC had recommended.  PTAC recommended additional payment models for implementation and testing in October 2017, but five months later, the Secretary of HHS had not responded to those recommendations.

3.   The CMMI Testing Process is Slow, Burdensome, Expensive, and Discourages Significant Innovation

When CMMI decides to pursue development and testing of an Alternative Payment Model, the process it uses is extremely long, complex, and resource-intensive. This not only slows down the process of testing and implementation but it reduces the number of models that CMMI can or will test. Although many proposals for innovative alternative payment models have been submitted to CMMI, most have not been implemented even after many months of discussion with CMMI staff and despite efforts to modify proposals to address concerns raised by CMMI. Once CMMI decides to pursue a payment demonstration, it typically takes 18-24 months or more from the time an initiative is first announced to the time when providers actually begin to receive different payments. Even if a payment model is succeeding and other providers would like to participate, the evaluation process will take 3-5 years to complete before a decision is made as to whether a payment model should be continued or expanded. As a result, under the current process for implementing APMs, it will take 6-8 years to make a desirable alternative payment model broadly available.

Providers report that the process of applying to participate in CMMI payment models is very burdensome. Providers are expected to complete lengthy application forms requiring submission of data and other information that is expensive and time-consuming to assemble, and applications may be rejected for failure to meet non-substantive requirements such as maximum page limits. Applicants may be required to respond within a few days to CMMI’s requests for more information, but the applicants receive no commitment from CMMI as to when it will make a decision regarding their application. This uncertainty makes it difficult for a provider organization to know whether and when to start preparing for participation; starting preparation too soon could mean significant financial losses if the applicant is not accepted, whereas waiting until an application is approved to begin implementation planning could make it difficult for the provider organization to generate savings and quality improvements in the timeframes required in the demonstration.

Once accepted into a CMMI APM, providers are required to assemble and submit large amounts of data and to participate in a variety of meetings; these administrative activities can involve significant costs for providers and/or take significant amounts of their time away from patient care. There is generally little or no compensation provided to practices to offset these costs, even though CMMI spends tens of millions of dollars to pay the consultants who review the information the providers submit and organize the meetings they attend. Many providers, particularly small providers, have decided not to even apply to participate in otherwise desirable CMMI programs and others have dropped out of the programs in the early phases solely or partly because of the cost and time burden of participating.

Providers who do participate in CMMI payment models are told they can only count on the new payments lasting for a few years; the payments will only be continued beyond that if an evaluation proves that the program has saved money for the Medicare program. While this might sound like a very prudent approach, it can have the perverse effect of reducing the chances of significant success. Physicians, hospitals, and other healthcare providers are unlikely to fundamentally change the way they deliver care in response to a payment change that may only last a few years, and it is impossible to measure longer-term impacts on outcomes during an evaluation period that lasts only a few years.

How CMS Can Implement More and Better Alternative Payment Models Faster

CMS and CMMI could dramatically accelerate the implementation of APMs through the following steps:

1.   Embrace a Bottom-Up Approach to Payment Innovation at CMS

As part of MACRA, Congress created a bottom-up approach that specifically welcomes APMs designed by physicians and other practitioners and that encourages development of APMs and delivery models that are feasible for small physician practices and small hospitals to implement. CMS should embrace the process that Congress has created and commit to quickly implement each of the physician-focused Alternative Payment Models that is recommended by the Physician-Focused Payment Model Technical Advisory Committee.

In addition, there are a number of communities across the country where physicians, hospitals, and other providers are working with patients, employers, health plans, and other purchasers to develop and implement alternative payment models to support high quality, more affordable care. If a group of providers and payers in a state or region have developed or implemented an innovative APM, CMS should agree to implement a similar approach to paying for the care of Medicare beneficiaries in that community so that the providers can have full multi-payer support.

2.   Create the Capacity at CMS and its MACs to Implement Bundled Payments and Other Alternative Payment Models

There is no single alternative payment model that will work for all types of patients and all types of healthcare providers. CMS and its Medicare Administrative Contractors (MACs) should quickly make any changes needed in Medicare claims payment and other administrative systems to support implementation of seven types of alternative payment model structures.

1. Payment for a High-Value Service.
2. Condition-Based Payment for Physician Services.
3. Multi-Physician Bundled Payment.
4. Physician-Facility Procedure Bundle.
5. Warrantied Payment for Physician Services.
6. Episode Payment for a Procedure.
7. Condition-Based Payment.

In addition, CMS should revise the definition of “financial risk” in the MACRA regulations for Advanced APMs to enable design of APMs that small physician practices can feasibly participate in. CMS should also designate any APM that is undergoing testing by the Innovation Center as an “Advanced” APM.

3. Use Limited Scale Testing to Accelerate Innovation

Fully specifying the parameters of an innovative Alternative Payment Model often requires information that can only be obtained from providers who are delivering services in a different way, but providers cannot deliver services in that way without having an alternative payment model to support them. Currently, CMMI will only test a payment model if it projects that the model will reduce Medicare spending. However, since it is impossible to confidently make such a projection without specifying the parameters of the model, CMMI’s current approach means that most innovative models will never be tested.

To address this problem, CMMI needs to create a process for “limited scale testing” of innovative alternative payment models. The following five-step process could be used for this:

1. Selection of pilot sites for limited-scale testing.
2. Implementation of the APM at the pilot sites with adjustment of the parameters based on experience.
3. Collection of data for setting APM parameters for future expansion.
4. Decision about broader-scale testing or implementation of a refined model.
5. Transition of pilot sites if a model is not continued.

4.   Create a Faster, More Efficient Approach for Implementing APMs

If CMMI continues to use its current process for testing and implementing alternative payment models in the future, it would take a decade before the majority of physicians in the country would have the ability to participate in an APM designed for the types of patients they care for. CMMI should completely redesign the processes it uses to test and implement alternative payment models in order to achieve the goals that are implicit in MACRA – every physician should have the opportunity to receive at least 25% of their revenues from alternative payment models in 2019, at least 50% of their revenues from APMs in 2021, and at least 75% of their revenues from APMs in 2023. To ensure that the MACRA goals are achieved, CMS should establish specific milestones that are designed to implement as many alternative payment models as possible and as quickly as possible.

 

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Thursday, April 13, 2017

A Revolution in Payment Reform Has Started

The first-ever “physician-focused payment models” were approved this week by the federal Physician-Focused Payment Model Technical Advisory Committee (PTAC). Instead of the traditional “top-down” approach to payment reform, where Medicare and other payers design payment systems that often don’t work well for physicians or patients, PTAC was created by Congress to enable a “bottom-up” approach in which physicians can design payment models that support the kind of care they believe patients need.

Project Sonar

The first of the payment models approved by PTAC was developed by a gastroenterologist in Illinois, Dr. Lawrence Kosinski, to support better care for patients with inflammatory bowel disease (IBD). Thanks to the willingness of Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois to implement the model with commercially-insured patients, Kosinski has already been able to show how having a better payment system can both improve patient care and save money. Patients who have been part of the project wrote to the PTAC describing how much better their care has been, and the health plan has said that it is saving significant amounts of money because patients haven’t been hospitalized as often.

But in order for all IBD patients to benefit from this improved care, Medicare and other payers around the country also need to implement the payment changes. Moreover, although the care delivery approach has been primarily used for IBD patients so far, it has the potential to support better care for patients who have other kinds of chronic health problems that need to be monitored closely to avoid the need for hospitalization, but those patients won’t be able to benefit either unless appropriate changes are made in the payment system.

Dr. Kosinski calls what he’s doing “Project Sonar” because he needed a way to regularly “ping” his patients to find out if they were developing problems so he could intervene early rather than only finding out after a patient is so sick they have to be hospitalized. The problem is the current fee-for-service system used by Medicare and most payers doesn’t pay for proactive contacts with patients and other care management services, so a physician practice that tried to do this routinely wouldn’t be able to cover the costs. Medicare and commercial health plans pay for office visits with the physician, but only if the patient schedules an appointment; the payers don’t pay for contacting the patient by phone or email to determine whether the patient needs a visit or not. The result is that Medicare and health plans end up paying for a lot of emergency room visits and hospitalizations that could have been avoided. That’s called “penny wise and pound foolish.”

ACS-Brandeis Advanced Alternative Payment Model

The second payment model approved by PTAC is very different. It’s designed to pay a wide range of physicians more when they deliver services as efficiently and effectively as possible during “episodes” of care, rather than paying them more for delivering unnecessary services, which is what the current fee-for-service system does. Although Medicare and other payers have tried to reward efficiency through Accountable Care Organization programs, those programs haven’t been successful because they don’t provide a way to change payment for the individual physicians who are actually delivering care to patients. The payment model developed by the American College of Surgeons and Brandeis University focuses payment changes on the teams of physicians (the “Clinical Affinity Groups”) that deliver specific types of care to patients. Moreover, it ties payment to how well the patient’s specific health problems are addressed, not just on how an individual procedure is delivered. Almost all of Medicare’s current “episode” payment models are limited to hospitalizations, which means that a patient has to be hospitalized before they can benefit from better care delivery, and in most cases the episode paymemt models are focused on surgeries, which ignores patients who can be treated without surgery (e.g., using medications or physical therapy). At the same time, the ACS-Brandeis model ensures that when surgery or another type of procedure is needed, the payment for the physicians who deliver the procedure is coordinated with the payments for the physicians who manage the underlying condition both before and after the procedure is performed, rather than forcing physicians to argue about “who generated the savings.”

What’s Next

The PTAC recommended both Project Sonar and the ACS-Brandeis Advanced Alternative Payment Model for “limited scale testing.” The PTAC defined this as a specific recommendation category because in many cases, specific elements of a payment model need further refinement before the model can be implemented on a broad enough scale to fully evaluate its impact, but that refinement cannot be completed without actually putting the payment model into operation in at least a small number of physician practices. For example, in the case of Project Sonar, although the payment model has already been used successfully for commercially-insured patients with inflammatory bowel disease, it is not clear how key parameters, such as the payment amounts and the spending targets, should be set for Medicare patients who are more likely to have multiple health problems and for whom additional time and resources may be needed to support both proactive outreach and coordination with other physicians.  The only way to choose the right parameters is to put the payment model in place so the costs and savings can be determined.

The PTAC’s recommendations are just that – recommendations to the Secretary of Health and Human Services that the two payment models should be tested in Medicare. The decision to actually carry out that testing is made by the Secretary, not PTAC, and then the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services would have to carry out the work needed to actually begin paying practices differently. Hopefully, the Secretary will agree with the PTAC’s recommendation and CMS will quickly implement the limited scale testing process.

Health insurance is becoming more and more unaffordable every year and the rapid growth in Medicare spending threatens the long-term viability of the program. The only way to solve those problems is to deliver health care in different ways. It is clear that there are many opportunities to significantly reduce healthcare spending today without harming patients, but it is also clear that the current payment system is a major barrier to achieving those opportunities. When solutions to the barriers are developed, they need to be implemented as rapidly as possible. Moreover, the payment changes need to be implemented in collaboration with physicians to support truly win-win-win outcomes – better care for patients, lower spending for Medicare, and financial viability and professional satisfaction for physicians.

First Steps in a Truly Revolutionary Process

Project Sonar and the ACS-Brandeis Advanced Alternative Payment Model are just the first of what will hopefully be many new physician-focused payment models developed by physicians, not payers. Congress recognized that the current approach to developing alternative payment models wasn’t working well, and it created the Physician-Focused Payment Model Technical Advisory Committee so that physicians would have the opportunity to develop better approaches. When he was a member of Congress, Secretary Price supported creation of the PTAC, and he attended the PTAC meeting on Tuesday to say that he felt physician-focused payment is key to an accessible, affordable, high-quality healthcare system.

The very first payment models PTAC considered demonstrate the wisdom of this approach. The payment model proposals were developed by practicing physicians, who attended the meeting in person and described the problems they saw with the care patients were receiving today and the barriers to improvement created by the current payment system. Their proposals and presentations explained how care could be better and spending could be lower with the payment models and care changes they had designed. The physicians also demonstrated that doctors can actually be enthusiastic about implementing a well-designed alternative payment model; they don’t have to be forced into it or given “incentives” to use it.

Additional proposals for physician-focused payment models have already been submitted to PTAC and many more are in the pipeline. The PTAC is also revolutionary because all of these proposals are available to the public, and the public has an opportunity to participate in the PTAC review process from the very beginning. The PTAC only makes its decisions about a proposal after obtaining public input on the proposal when it is first submitted, and all of the PTAC’s deliberations about the proposal are conducted in a public meeting with opportunities for public comment on a draft report prepared by a subset of the PTAC members.

More information about PTAC and copies of all of the proposals and letters of intent that have been submitted to date are available on the PTAC website at https://aspe.hhs.gov/proposal-submissions-physician-focused-payment-model-technical-advisory-committee . You can receive email updates on the PTAC work through the PTAC email listserv and you can also follow PTAC on Twitter at @PFPMTAC.

 

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Tuesday, January 03, 2017

How to Make Health Insurance Affordable

Affordable Health Insurance Requires Lower Cost Health Care.  The goal of the Affordable Care Act was not just to make health insurance available, but to make it affordable.  The ability to buy health insurance means little if the combination of premiums, deductibles, and cost-sharing makes the insurance unaffordable.  But health insurance will not be affordable unless health care can be delivered at a much lower cost than it is today.

The Cost of Health Care Can be Significantly Reduced Without Rationing.  The good news is that the cost of healthcare can be reduced significantly without denying patients the care they need.  Many patients develop health problems that could have been prevented, receive tests and procedures that are not needed, are hospitalized because their health problems were not effectively managed, or experience complications and infections that could have been avoided. Other patients could receive different types of treatment than they do today that would be equally effective but cost less. The Institute of Medicine’s 2011 study The Healthcare Imperative: Lowering Costs and Improving Outcomes found that 30% of healthcare spending could be eliminated without harming patients.  If these unnecessary and avoidable health problems, services, and costs were eliminated, hundreds of billions of dollars would be saved, health insurance premiums could be reduced, and the quality of life for the patients would improve.

Current Payment Systems Prevent Healthcare Providers From Delivering Lower Cost Care.  Most of these unnecessary costs persist because of problems with the way health insurance plans pay physicians, hospitals, and other healthcare providers. The two most important barriers are:

  • Lack of payment or inadequate payment for high-value services. Medicare and most health plans do not pay physicians for many services that would benefit patients and help reduce avoidable spending. For example, there is generally no payment or inadequate payment for:
    • responding to a patient’s phone call about a symptom or problem, even though it could help the patient avoid the need for far more expensive services, such as an emergency department visit;
    • communications between primary care physicians and specialists to coordinate care, or the time spent by a physician serving as the leader of a multi-physician care team, which can avoid ordering of duplicate tests and prescribing conflicting medications;
    • communications between community physicians and emergency physicians, and short-term treatment and discharge planning in emergency departments, which could enable patients to be safely discharged without admission;
    • providing proactive telephone outreach to high-risk patients to ensure they get preventive care, which could prevent serious health problems or identify them at earlier stages when they can be treated more successfully;
    • spending time in a shared decision-making process with patients and family members when there are multiple treatment options, which has been shown to reduce the frequency of invasive procedures and the use of low-value treatments;
    • hiring nurses and other staff to provide education and self-management support to patients and family members, which could help them manage their health problems more effectively and avoid hospitalizations for exacerbations of their condition;
    • providing palliative care for patients in conjunction with treatment, which can improve quality of life for patients and reduce the use of expensive treatments; and
    • providing non-health care services (such as transportation to help patients visit the physician’s office) which could avoid the need for more expensive medical services (such as the patient being taken by ambulance to an emergency department).
  • Financial penalties for delivering a lower-cost mix of services.  Under fee for service (FFS) payment, physician practices and hospitals lose revenue if they perform fewer procedures or lower-cost procedures, but the costs of running the practices and the hospitals generally do not decrease by as much as revenues decrease. Under FFS, physician practices and hospitals do not get paid at all when their patients stay healthy and do not need health care services.  If physician practices and hospitals do not receive sufficient revenues to cover their fixed costs, they will not be able to continue delivering care to the patients who need it.

Alternative Payment Models (APMs) Are Needed to Solve These Problems.   Most of the so-called “value-based payment” programs used by CMS and commercial payers make small changes in current FFS payment rates based on measures of quality or total spending, but they do not remove the barriers in the payment system described above.  The problem to be solved is not a lack of “incentives” for physicians or hospitals to deliver care in a different way, but the failure of the current payment system to provide the flexibility providers need to deliver care in a more efficient but financially sustainable way.  A good Alternative Payment Model (APM) has two key elements:

  • Adequate, Flexible Resources to Deliver Effective Care to Patients. The APM must give physicians and other providers the types and amounts of resources they need to deliver the services patients need in the most efficient and effective way possible. If the current payment system does not pay for the specific services physicians need to deliver in order to improve outcomes or reduce spending on other types of services, the APM must authorize payment for those services, broaden the definition of the services that can be provided using existing payments, or   In many cases, physicians don’t need more money, but they need to use the current money differently – for example, using payments to provide services to patients over the phone or by using a nurse rather than only through a face-to-face visit between the physician and patient.  Payments must also be appropriately risk-adjusted based on characteristics of patients that increase their need for services.  Paying physicians, hospitals, and other providers the same amount regardless of a patient’s needs will mean that many higher-need patients won’t get adequate services.
  • Accountability for Costs and Quality That Physicians Can Control. In return for more flexible payments, physicians must assure patients and payers that spending will be controlled or reduced and that quality will be maintained or However, individual physicians can only be expected to take accountability for the aspects of spending and quality they can control or influence.  For example, physicians can’t control the price of drugs, but they can control which drugs are used; they can’t control how much a hospital charges when a patient needs to be hospitalized, but they can reduce the rate of hospitalizations, and they can use lower-cost hospitals where they still exist.  The goal of APMs should not be to simply shift financial risk from payers to physician practices, but rather to ask physicians to take accountability for the aspects of costs and quality they can control or influence.

In some cases, a small change in the current payment system, such as payment for a specific type of service in addition to existing FFS payments, may be all that is needed to support better outcomes and lower overall costs. In other cases, a more significant change may be needed, such as restructuring payments for many different services delivered by multiple providers.

(For more details on how to design alternative payment models and physician-focused payment models that actually remove the barriers to higher-value care, see A Guide to Physician-Focused Payment Models and The Building Blocks of Successful Payment Reform, which are available at www.CHQPR.org .)

Physicians That Have Participated in Well-Designed APMs Have Shown They Can Significantly Reduce Costs.  For example:

  • Stephen Zabinski, an orthopedic surgeon in New Jersey, was able to completely redesign the way services were delivered to patients receiving hip and knee surgery. He gave them “pre-hab” services to make them healthier for surgeries, which improved their recovery times, and he organized lower-cost post-surgery rehab services that enabled the patients to go home rather than going to a nursing facility for rehab.  Instead of 33% of patients going home, now 80% go home after discharge, and the total cost of the procedure – not just the surgery, but the total cost with rehab – went down by 20%.  This was only possible because Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield was willing to pay him differently to enable him to deliver better care at lower cost.
  • Barbara McAneny, an oncologist in New Mexico, has led a multi-site project that has reduced the frequency with which cancer patients have to go to the emergency room or be hospitalized to treat complications of their chemotherapy. She re-designed care so patients can call her office as soon as they start having a fever, nausea, or diarrhea, rather than them waiting until they’re so sick they have to go to the ER.  She brings them into the office and treats them immediately so they don’t have to go to the ER or be hospitalized.  She was able to reduce ED visits by 36%, hospital admissions by 43%, and reduce total spending on the patients by 22%.  She had to use federal grant funds to support these changes in care; it wasn’t possible under the standard way that Medicare and health plans pay for oncology services.
  • Steve Calvin, a maternal/fetal medicine physician in Minneapolis, offers a “birth bundle” to parents so they know in advance the full cost of delivering a baby. The birth bundle provides the flexibility for the mother to deliver the baby in a birth center rather than a hospital, while enabling her to have immediate access to hospital care if there are complications of pregnancy.  Together with nurse midwife colleagues, he opened a birth center across the street from Abbott Northwestern hospital.  The midwives have hospital privileges and they can transfer and care for mothers at the hospital if they need a higher level of care or physician involvement.  The result is the ability to offer maternity and newborn care for significantly (15%) less than traditional hospital deliveries.  In addition, the rate of C-Sections has been much lower than the national average (9% vs. 33%).
  • Jennifer Wiler, an emergency physician in Denver, developed a program to create a “medical home” in the emergency room for low-income patients who were coming repeatedly to the emergency room because they had no primary care physician or other source of care. The program was implemented in 5 communities (Allentown PA, Aurora CO, Kansas City MO, Camden NJ, and San Diego CA).  The result was a 41% reduction in emergency department visits and a 50% reduction in total cost (i.e., costs decreased by 50% even including the cost of the additional services).  Federal grant funds had to be used to support the costs, because Medicaid does not pay for these services.
  • Andrew Haig, a physiatrist (a physician specializing in rehabilitation) in Michigan, organized a program to help patients with back pain understand and access non-surgical treatment options, such as physical therapy. The result was a 29% reduction in spine surgery and a 12% reduction in total cost of treating back pain.  This was only possible thanks to support by Priority Health, a local health plan in West Michigan.

Medicare and Most Health Plans Do Not Use Physician-Focused Alternative Payment Models to Pay Physicians.  Although the Affordable Care Act created the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation in 2010 in order to accelerate the development and implementation of innovative payment and delivery models, relatively little progress has been made in implementing the kinds of payment models that would enable every physician to do what Drs. Calvin, Haig, McAneny, Wiler, and Zabinski have done.  As the American Medical Association has stated, “Years after CMS was authorized to implement ‘new patient care models’…Medicare still does not enable the majority of physicians to pursue …opportunities to improve care in ways that could also reduce costs.  Today, despite all of the demonstration projects and other initiatives that Medicare has implemented, most physicians – in primary care and other specialties – still do not have access to Medicare payment models that provide the resources and flexibility they need to improve care for their Medicare patients.  Consequently, most Medicare patients still are not benefiting from regular access to a full range of care coordination services, coordinated treatment planning by primary care and specialist physicians, support for patient self-management of their chronic conditions, proactive outreach to ensure that high-risk patients get preventive care, or patient decision-support tools.  As a result, the Medicare program is paying for hospitalizations and duplicative services that could have been avoided had physicians been able to deliver these high-value services.”

The same is true of most Medicaid programs and commercial health plans.  Premiums for health insurance policies will continue to increase if the insurance companies who offer them continue to pay for treating problems but not for preventing them.

Accountable Care Organizations Don’t Solve the Problems with Current Payment Systems.  Despite three years of effort, the CMS ACO program has increased Medicare spending rather than reducing it, and the losses increased in 2015.  The reason the program isn’t working is very simple – there is no change in the way the individual physicians or hospitals in an ACO are paid.  They continue to receive the same payments in the same way they would if they were not in the ACO, but they get a bonus a year later if they have spent less than other physicians and hospitals do.  This program, and similar programs used by commercial health plans, provides no upfront resources to enable physician practices to improve the way they deliver care, and it encourages providers to deny or delay care to patients in order to get short-term financial bonuses.

Bundled Payment Initiatives Focus on the Wrong Thing.  Although CMS and some commercial health plans have implemented bundled payment programs in addition to ACOs, almost all of them require the patient to be hospitalized in order to “trigger” the bundled payment.  But the biggest savings opportunities come from helping patients avoid hospitalizations, not from reducing costs after the patient is already in the hospital.  Neither CMS nor commercial health plans have implemented “condition-based payments” that enable physicians to better manage patients’ health conditions so they can avoid unnecessary hospitalizations and surgeries.

Alternative Payment Models are Needed for Hospitals as Well as Physicians.  The largest component of total healthcare spending is hospital care, and most of the opportunities to reduce spending without rationing are based on reducing avoidable hospitalizations, reducing unnecessary hospital procedures, and delivering procedures outside of hospitals.  However, significant losses of revenues could jeopardize the ability of hospitals, particularly small hospitals in rural areas, to maintain essential services in their communities, such as the emergency room, the cardiac catheterization lab, trauma care, etc.  Rather than simply paying hospitals higher prices for every service they offer, alternative payment models are needed that provide adequate funding to hospitals to cover the costs of these essential services without tying their payments and operating margins to the volume of services they deliver.  Value-based healthcare payment and delivery initiatives will not succeed if they do not provide better ways of sustaining community hospitals.

Alternative Payment Models Are Needed for All Patients, Not Just “High-Cost” Patients.  In any given year, a relatively small proportion of patients accounts for a large proportion of healthcare spending.  This has led many payers to focus alternative payment models only on these “high cost” patients.  However, the savings they claim to achieve is illusory, because regardless of what is done, the majority of those patients won’t have high costs the following year, and a new set of high-cost patients will take their place.  In many cases, spending on the patients is higher than other patients in a given year simply because they had a temporary health problem or need that year, e.g., the patient needed a hip replacement, developed cancer, or was delivering a baby.  In other cases, spending was high because the patient wasn’t treated effectively in the past, e.g., their cancer wasn’t identified early, or their diabetes wasn’t treated properly.  Although high cost services like joint replacement and cancer care can be delivered at lower cost than today, the biggest opportunity to reduce spending occurs before the patient becomes sick enough to require expensive treatment.  This requires paying physicians in ways that enable them to more effectively manage chronic conditions and deliver preventive care than current payment systems allow.

CMS and Private Health Plans Need to Move More Rapidly to Create True Alternative Payment Models for All Types of Physicians, Hospitals, and Patients.  Although Congress created a mechanism for developing alternative payment models – the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI) – CMMI has used a far more complex and resource-intensive process to implement alternative payment models than is required or necessary.  Under most of the payment demonstrations that it has implemented to date, 18 months or more have elapsed from the time an initiative is first announced to the time when providers actually begin to receive different payments.  This process is expensive for CMMI to administer, it dramatically reduces the number of alternative payment models that can be implemented, and it is also extremely burdensome for providers who are interested in participating in the initiatives that CMMI does attempt to implement.  Many physicians and hospitals have decided not to apply to participate in otherwise desirable payment reforms, and others have dropped out of the programs in the early phases, because of the cost and time burden of participating and/or the problematic requirements that are imposed.

As slow as this process has been, CMS has made far more progress in implementing alternative payment models than the private sector.  The “value-based payments” most commercial health plans are using are small pay-for-performance programs and shared savings models that have not and will not result in any significant changes in the cost or quality of healthcare services.  Only a few commercial health plans, such as Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield, Priority Health, and the Health Care Services Corporation, have implemented truly innovative payment models in areas such as gastroenterology, maternity care, oncology, and orthopedics.

This is clearly not what Congress intended either in the Affordable Care Act or in MACRA.  A more aggressive timetable and a complete re-engineering of the processes CMS and commercial health plans use to implement alternative payment models is needed.  This re-engineering process should start with the goal that is implicit in MACRA: every physician should have the opportunity to receive at least 25% of their Medicare revenues from physician-focused alternative payment models (not ACOs) in 2019, 50% of their total revenues from APMs in 2021, and 75% in 2023.  CMS and commercial health plans should work collaboratively with physician groups and hospitals to design and rapidly implement the full range of true alternative payment models needed to reach those goals.  Only then will the country achieve the kinds of savings needed to make health insurance not just available, but truly affordable.

(A pdf version of this post can be downloaded here.)

 

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Wednesday, July 06, 2016

What CMS Should Do to Accelerate Implementation of Alternative Payment Models (Part 2)

Significant changes in the MACRA regulations proposed by CMS are necessary for encouraging the development and implementation of Alternative Payment Models, but regulatory changes alone are not sufficient.  The processes that CMS currently uses to implement APMs are far too slow and burdensome to achieve Congress’s goal of enabling as many physicians as possible to participate in APMs.  CMS must create better, faster ways to implement Alternative Payment Models that meet the requirements of the law and regulations.

How CMS Should Improve Its Processes for Implementing APMs

Although the Affordable Care Act created the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation in 2010 in order to accelerate the development and implementation of innovative payment and delivery models, relatively little progress has been made in improving the ways most physicians and other providers are paid for their services.  As the American Medical Association has stated, “Five years after CMS was authorized to implement ‘new patient care models’…Medicare still does not enable the majority of physicians to pursue …opportunities to improve care in ways that could also reduce costs.  Today, despite all of the demonstration projects and other initiatives that Medicare has implemented, most physicians – in primary care and other specialties – still do not have access to Medicare payment models that provide the resources and flexibility they need to improve care for their Medicare patients.  Consequently, most Medicare patients still are not benefiting from regular access to a full range of care coordination services, coordinated treatment planning by primary care and specialist physicians, support for patient self-management of their chronic conditions, proactive outreach to ensure that high-risk patients get preventive care, or patient decision-support tools.  As a result, the Medicare program is paying for hospitalizations and duplicative services that could have been avoided had physicians been able to deliver these high-value services.”

Creating a More Efficient Approach to Implementing APMs at HHS

One key reason for this slow progress is that the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI) has created a far more complex and resource-intensive process than is required or necessary to implement alternative payment models.  Under most of the payment demonstrations that it has implemented to date, 18 months or more have elapsed from the time an initiative is first announced to the time when providers actually begin to receive different payments.  Moreover, many proposals for alternative payment models have been submitted to CMMI that have not been implemented.  This is not because the staff at CMMI are slow or incompetent, but because of the complex, expensive, and time-intensive process they have created for designing the initiative, selecting participants, managing the payments, and evaluating the results as part of any payment model they test.

This process is extremely burdensome and expensive for CMMI to administer, it dramatically reduces the number of alternative payment models that can be tested, and it is also extremely burdensome for providers who are interested in participating in the initiatives that CMMI does attempt to implement.  Many providers have decided not to even apply to participate in otherwise desirable CMMI programs and others have dropped out of the programs in the early phases solely or partly because of the cost and time burden of participating.

This burdensome process is not required by either the Affordable Care Act or MACRA.  If HHS were to attempt to implement every new alternative payment model using the approaches that are currently being used by CMMI, it would take many years before even a fraction of the physicians in the country would have the ability to meet the APM requirements under MACRA.  This would mean relatively few Medicare beneficiaries could benefit from the higher quality care that would be possible under APMs and the Medicare program would not achieve the savings that APMs could generate.  This is clearly not what Congress intended either in the Affordable Care Act or in MACRA.

A complete re-engineering of the processes HHS uses to implement alternative payment models is needed.  This re-engineering process should start with the goal that is implicit in MACRA – every physician should have the opportunity to receive at least 25% of their Medicare revenues from alternative payment models in 2019, 50% of their revenues in 2021, and 75% in 2023.  HHS should then work backward from those dates and design processes and timetables for implementing APMs in every medical specialty that will achieve that goal. 

Just as many physicians, hospitals, and other healthcare providers are now re-engineering their care delivery processes to eliminate steps that do not add significant value, HHS should use Lean design techniques and other approaches to identify and eliminate all steps and requirements in its implementation processes that do not add value or that impede achieving the goals that Congress has set.  Moreover, since MACRA allows alternative payment models to be implemented using statutory authorizations other than Section 1115A (the enabling legislation for CMMI), HHS should use all of the options available under MACRA in order to implement desirable alternative payment models in the most efficient way possible.

In order for a physician to be participating in an APM during 2019, the processes for approving and implementing the APM and for approving the physician’s participation in the APM will have to be completed no later than the end of 2018.  However, in order for physicians to succeed under APMs, they will need to have sufficient lead time to form or join an alternative payment entity and to redesign the processes by which they deliver care with the flexibility provided by the APM, and so both the structure of the APM and the approval for a physician’s participation will need to be completed long before the end of 2018.  Some physician groups and medical specialty societies have already developed physician-focused alternative payment models that should be able to meet the criteria under MACRA; these could and should be implemented by CMS as soon as 2017.

To ensure that the MACRA goals are achieved, HHS should establish specific milestones that are designed to implement as many alternative payment models as possible and as quickly as possible.  For example, the following timetable would allow payments under an alternative payment model to begin flowing to a physician within one year after the model is recommended by the PTAC:

  • When a physician-focused alternative payment model is recommended for implementation by the Physician-Focused Payment Model Technical Advisory Committee (PTAC) that was created by Congress under MACRA, CMS should plan to implement it unless there is a compelling reason not to do so. The decision to implement the model should be made within 60 days after it is recommended by the PTAC.
  • Once a physician-focused alternative payment model is recommended by the PTAC and approved by HHS, the applications that physician practices and alternative payment entities would need to complete in order to participate in the approved APM should be made available within 90 days.
  • Physicians and alternative payment entities should be permitted to apply to participate in an approved APM no less frequently than twice per year.
  • Applications to participate in an approved APM should be reviewed and approved or rejected within 60 days. Applications should only be rejected if an applicant cannot demonstrate that it has the ability to implement the model, not because of arbitrary limits on the size of the program or the locations where providers can be located.  If an application is rejected, CMS should provide feedback to the applicant on the reasons for rejection and methods of correction.  If a rejected application is revised and resubmitted, CMS should re-review it and approve or reject it within 30 days.
  • CMS should implement an approved APM with the approved physician applicants no later than 90 days after the applications by physician practices to participate have been approved.
  • Once a physician or other clinician begins to participate in an APM, they should be permitted to continue doing so as long as they wish to, unless CMS can demonstrate that Medicare spending under the payment model is higher than it would be under the standard physician fee schedule or that the quality of care for beneficiaries is being harmed.

Creating the Capability at HHS to Implement a Broad Range of Physician-Focused APMs

A second key reason why only a small number of physicians are participating in alternative payment models under Medicare is the problematic structure of the current models that CMS and CMMI have been using.  Most of the payment models that are currently being implemented or tested by CMS use a very similar approach – no changes in the current fee for service structure, holding individual physicians accountable for the costs of all services their patients receive from all providers, adjusting payment amounts based on shared savings calculations for attributed patients, etc. – and these approaches not only fail to solve the problems in the current payment systems, they can actually make them worse.

The components used in most CMS payment models are very problematic for physicians and therefore they are likely problematic for their patients as well.  Although CMS may view some of these payment models as “physician-focused” because they are targeted at individual physicians or physician practices, the goal should be to create physician-focused payment models that are successful in improving care and improving costs in ways that are feasible for physician practices, particularly small practices, to implement.  To date, the alternative payment models implemented by CMS have not been successful in reducing costs because they do not provide the kinds of support that physicians need to redesign care.  New physician-focused payment models should not be required to use the same flawed approaches that are being used in current CMS payment demonstrations.

At a minimum, HHS should create the administrative capabilities to implement seven different types of physician-focused APMs that can be used to address the most common types of opportunities and barriers that exist across all physician specialties.  These are:

  1. Payment for a High-Value Service. Under this APM, a physician practice could be paid for delivering one or more desirable services that are not currently billable, and the physician would take accountability for controlling the use of other, avoidable services for their patients.
  2. Condition-Based Payment for Physician Services. Under this APM, a physician practice would have the flexibility to use the diagnostic or treatment options that address a patient’s condition most efficiently and effectively without concern that using lower-cost options would harm the operating margins of the physician’s practice.
  3. Multi-Physician Bundled Payment. Under this APM, two or more physician practices that are providing complementary diagnostic or treatment services to a patient would have the flexibility to redesign those services in ways that would enable high-quality care to be delivered as efficiently as possible.
  4. Physician-Facility Procedure Bundle. This APM would allow a physician who delivers a procedure at a hospital or other facility to choose the most appropriate facility for the treatment and to give the physician and facility the flexibility to deliver the procedure in the most efficient and high-quality way.
  5. Warrantied Payment for Physician Services. This APM would give a physician the flexibility and accountability to deliver care with as low a rate of complications as possible.
  6. Episode Payment for a Procedure. This APM would enable a physician who is delivering a particular procedure to work collaboratively with the other providers delivering services related to the procedure (e.g., the facility where the procedure is performed, other physicians who are involved in the procedure, physicians and facilities who are involved in the patient’s recovery or in treating complications of the procedure, etc.) in order to improve outcomes and control the total spending associated with the procedure.
  7. Condition-Based Payment. Under this APM, a physician practice would have the flexibility to use the diagnosis or treatment options that address a particular health condition (or combination of conditions) most efficiently and effectively and to work collaboratively with other providers who deliver services for the patient’s condition in order to improve outcomes and control the total spending associated with care for the condition.

More detail on each of these physician-focused Alternative Payment Models and examples of how they could be used to improve care for a wide range of patient conditions is available in a report developed by CHQPR and the American Medical Association entitled A Guide to Physician-Focused Alternative Payment Models (available at www.CHQPR.org).

HHS should begin immediately to implement the administrative systems needed to support all of these types of payment models.  This would not only ensure that the APMs can be implemented by 2019, but it would encourage physician groups and medical specialty societies to design payment models in a common framework, which will reduce implementation costs for HHS.

Re-engineering the processes for implementing alternative payment models as discussed above should dramatically increase the capacity of HHS to implement more payment models more quickly than it can today.  However, if there are insufficient staff or resources at HHS/CMS/CMMI to support implementation of a sufficient number of new alternative payment models to enable all physicians to participate, additional resources should be provided to achieve the necessary “bandwidth.”  Failing to allocate sufficient resources to implement alternative payment models that will save money for the Medicare program would be “penny wise and pound foolish.”

Greater Accountability is Needed by CMS As Well As Physicians

It would obviously be a tremendous waste of time and energy for physician groups, medical specialty societies, and others to develop alternative payment models that meet the requirements of the regulations if they will not be implemented by CMS.  Consequently, it will be essential that CMS create the necessary systems and processes so that it can implement alternative payment models that meet the statutory and regulatory requirements.  MACRA and the implementing regulations significantly increase the accountability that physicians will need to accept in return for payment.  CMS needs to make comparable commitments to greater accountability for improving its own efficiency and effectiveness in designing and implementing new payment models.

(The points above as well as additional comments on the proposed MACRA regulations are included in the Center for Healthcare Quality and Payment Reform’s formal comment letter to CMS on the proposed MACRA regulations, which can be downloaded here.)

 

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Tuesday, July 05, 2016

What CMS Should Do to Accelerate Implementation of Alternative Payment Models (Part 1)

Thousands of comments were filed last week on the proposed regulations to implement the provisions of the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA) related to the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) and Alternative Payment Models (APMs).  One of the most important decisions CMS will need to make in finalizing the regulations is how to revise the proposed criteria for APMs.

How CMS Should Define Criteria for APMs that Match Congressional Intent

In MACRA, Congress clearly intended to encourage the development and implementation of Alternative Payment Models.  It created significant incentives for physicians who participate in APMs at a minimum level, including:

  • Exempting them from MIPS
  • Awarding them a 5% lump sum bonus for six years
  • Giving them a higher annual update (increase) in their FFS revenues

These incentives are in addition to the benefits of participating in the APM itself.

Congress also clearly intended to encourage the development and implementation of APMs by establishing a very small number of very basic requirements for the APMs that would qualify for these incentives:

  • the APMs should involve more than nominal financial risk;
  • the APMs should use quality measures comparable to MIPS; and
  • the APMs should use certified EHR technology.

Unfortunately, in the proposed regulations, CMS went far beyond what Congress proposed, labeling the APMs to which the incentives would apply as “advanced” APMs and defining the Congressional criteria in very burdensome and restrictive ways.  If the proposed regulations were implemented, they would serve as a serious barrier to progress in designing, implementing, and encouraging physician participation in Alternative Payment Models, which is completely counter to what Congress intended.

Congress did not use the term “advanced” to describe alternative payment models, nor did it in any fashion indicate that physicians should only be rewarded for participating in a narrowly defined subset of “advanced” Alternative Payment Models.  The final regulations need to be significantly revised so they do what was envisioned by Congress – accelerate the implementation of successful Alternative Payment Models.

“More Than Nominal Financial Risk” Does Not Mean “Significant Financial Risk”

MACRA requires that in order for a physician to be exempt from MIPS and to qualify for the bonus payments and higher updates authorized by Congress, the alternative payment entity (i.e., the organizational entity that is actually receiving payments under the alternative payment model) must bear “financial risk for monetary losses under … [an] … alternative payment model that are in excess of a nominal amount.”  The term “financial risk for monetary losses” in MACRA clearly refers to losses in the operations of the alternative payment entity, not to losses or increased spending in the Medicare program.  However, in the proposed regulations, CMS defined risk for all but small primary care practices in terms of Medicare spending.

It is inappropriate to measure the amount of risk accepted by a physician practice or other provider in terms of the percentage change in total Medicare spending on the practice’s patients because (a) even a small percentage of Medicare spending can exceed the total revenues of a physician practice, and (b) the ratio of Medicare spending to physician practice revenues varies dramatically from specialty to specialty.

Under the proposed regulations, for most types of physician practices and APMs, CMS would require that an alternative payment entity be at risk for at least 4% of total Medicare spending in order for the participating physicians to qualify for the Congressional incentives.  Since payments to physicians currently represent about 19% of total Medicare Part A and Part B spending, requiring them to pay CMS for up to 4% of Medicare spending would represent, on average, a payment of more than 20% of the physician practice’s revenue.  Causing a physician practice to lose 20% of its revenue is clearly far “more than nominal” risk – it is significant financial risk.

Although payments to physician represent 19% of Medicare spending on average, for many physician practices, their revenues represent a much smaller percentage of total Medicare spending on their patients.  In many cases, a physician practice’s revenues may represent less than 5% of total Medicare spending on their patients.  For these practices, a 4% change in Medicare spending could represent 100% or more of the practice’s revenues.  A physician practice could be forced out of business if it is held responsible for paying for even a very small percentage change in the total Medicare spending for the practice’s patients.  Moreover, the fact that 4% of Medicare spending represents a higher amount relative to physician practice revenues for different specialties would mean that physicians in different specialties would face different levels of risk to participate in APMs, and there is no indication that Congress intended that.

It seems quite clear that in using the term “more than nominal financial risk,” Congress did not mean “significant” financial risk or it would have used that term in the law.  In is inappropriate for CMS to issue regulations that are so clearly at odds with Congressional intent.

However, CMS has defined the solution to this problem in the proposed regulations.  The proposed regulations created a separate definition of risk for small primary care practices participating in medical home programs that is based on a percentage of their revenues, not a percentage of Medicare spending.  There is no reason to limit this approach just to small primary care practices or medical home programs.  All physician practices should have their risk defined in terms of the amount of their revenues they could lose, rather than the percentage of Medicare spending they would be required to pay. 

Risk is Created by Unreimbursed Costs as Well as Reductions in Payment

Basing risk on a practice’s revenues only solves part of the problem with the regulations, however.  The financial risk incurred by an alternative payment entity is a function of the costs that the alternative payment entity incurs to implement the alternative payment model as well as the revenues it receives under the model.  If the alternative payment entity hires or pays for new staff to deliver services to patients under the alternative payment model, if it acquires new or different equipment to deliver services, or if it incurs other kinds of expenses to implement the alternative payment model, and if those expenses are not automatically or directly reimbursed by Medicare, then the alternative payment entity is accepting financial risk for monetary losses.

One of the reasons for creating APMs is that Medicare does not currently pay physicians for many services that would benefit patients and help reduce avoidable spending.  For example, there is generally no payment or inadequate payment for:

  • responding to a patient’s phone call about a symptom or problem, even though that could help the patient avoid the need for far more expensive services, such as an emergency department visit;
  • communications between primary care physicians and specialists to coordinate care, even though that type of communication and coordination can avoid ordering of duplicate tests and prescribing conflicting medications;
  • communications between community physicians and emergency physicians, even though that could enable patients to be safely discharged without admission;
  • time spent by a physician serving as the leader of a multi-physician care team for patients with complex conditions;
  • providing proactive telephone outreach to high-risk patients to ensure they get preventive care, even though that could prevent serious health problems or identify them at earlier stages when they can be treated more successfully;
  • spending time in a shared decision-making process with patients and family members when there are multiple treatment options, even though that has been shown to reduce the frequency of invasive procedures and the use of low-value treatments;
  • hiring nurses and other staff to provide education and self-management support to patients and family members, even though that could help them manage their health problems more effectively and avoid hospitalizations for exacerbations;
  • providing palliative care for patients in conjunction with treatment, even though that can improve quality of life for patients and reduce the use of expensive treatments; and
  • providing non-health care services (such as transportation to help patients visit the physician’s office), even if those services would avoid the need for more expensive medical services (such as the patient being taken by ambulance to an emergency department).

If an alternative payment entity implemented these kinds of services under an alternative payment model in order to help improve outcomes for its patients and reduce Medicare spending, it could easily incur monetary losses even Medicare has achieved savings.  For example, even under an “upside only” shared savings model, a physician practice or other provider incurs financial risk if it incurs costs to deliver services to beneficiaries that are designed to reduce Medicare spending, since the provider could fail to qualify for the shared savings payment it needs to pay for those costs even when Medicare spending has been reduced.

Consequently, financial risk cannot be defined simply in terms of the potential reduction in revenues the alternative payment entity could receive from Medicare.  An alternative payment entity’s “financial risk for monetary losses” under an alternative payment model should be defined as the potential difference between the amount of costs the entity incurs or is obligated to pay as part of the alternative payment model and the amount of revenues that it could receive under the APM.  The greater the costs it incurs or the lower the revenue it could potentially receive, the greater the financial risk it will face under the APM.

Setting a Reasonable Threshold for “More Than Nominal”

Although many people seem to think that “financial risk” is only associated with alternative payment models, there is financial risk involved in any payment system other than one which reimburses physicians or other providers for their actual costs.  Today, physician practices incur financial risk for monetary losses under the fee-for-service payment system because the costs they incur for office space, equipment, and staff are not directly reimbursed by Medicare, and if the practice does not deliver enough services to generate fee-for-service payment revenues in excess of those costs, it could be forced to declare bankruptcy.  The measure of a good alternative payment model should not be how much it increases financial risk for physician practices and other providers, but rather how effectively it realigns their financial risk so that financial losses result from delivering lower quality care rather than from delivering fewer services.

In MACRA, Congress has placed all physicians’ payments “at risk” under the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS).  In the initial year of the program (2019), physician payments could be reduced by 4%, and the maximum reduction increases to 9% in 2022.  These amounts are presumably “more than nominal” if Congress expected them to influence physician performance on the measures defined in MIPS, which includes resource measures.

Consequently, “more than nominal” risk for APMs could be defined using the maximum reduction amounts that are used in MIPS.  In 2019, since a physician’s payments could be reduced by 4% under MIPS even with no change in the physician’s costs, an alternative payment entity should be viewed as being at “more than nominal financial risk” if the amount of costs that it incurs under an alternative payment model could exceed the amount of revenue it receives under the model by at least 4%.

Use of Quality Measures

In addition to requiring minimum levels of financial risk, MACRA requires that an APM “provide for payment for covered professional services based on quality measures.”  It does not require that the amounts of payment be a “factor” in determining the amount of payment, as CMS has proposed in the regulations.  This excessively narrow interpretation of the MACRA requirements in the proposed regulations led CMS to declare that one of its most widely used and potentially successful programs – the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement (BPCI) program – would not qualify as an APM under MACRA.

If a payment model is designed to achieve savings, the Affordable Care Act requires only that the payment model do so “without reducing the quality of care.”  Consequently, an APM should be considered a qualified alternative payment model if it (1) measures quality and (2) requires a minimum standard of quality to be met in order for physicians to continue to participate in the APM.  This would allow a much broader range of current and future APMs to qualify.

Use of EHR Technology

In addition to the provisions regarding financial risk and quality, MACRA requires that participants in an alternative payment model “use” certified EHR technology.  After several years of HHS trying to define “meaningful use” of EHRs, there is widespread agreement that detailed requirements regarding how clinicians should use EHRs have increased costs and harmed quality rather than improving it.  Since MACRA simply requires “use” of the EHR, regulations regarding use of EHRs in APMs should only require that clinical data about the patients receiving care as part of the alternative payment model be stored in a certified electronic health record system.  It is impossible to prescribe how a physician or other provider should “use” the technology beyond this without potentially interfering with the provider’s flexibility to deliver services in the most effective way or imposing unnecessary costs and administrative burdens on the provider.  A physician practice participating in the APM will have a strong incentive to use the EHR if the EHR has capabilities that will improve the practice’s success, regardless of any specific requirements imposed by HHS.  Any specific requirements for “use” of EHRs that are imposed in regulations should be treated as a cost that increases the financial risk for a physician practice to participate in the APM if the cost is not explicitly supported by the APM itself.

What the Final Regulations Should Say

The final regulations should not label APMs that meet the Congressional criteria as “advanced” APMs, they should define “more than nominal risk” based on a reasonable percentage of a practice’s costs and revenues, and they should establish more reasonable and flexible requirements for quality measures and EHR use.  To do this, the final regulations could be revised to read as follows:

414.1415 Qualified APM criteria

(a) Use of certified electronic health record technology. The following constitutes use of CEHRT:

**

(2) Required use of certified EHR technology. To be a Qualified APM, an APM Entity must store clinical data in CEHRT regarding the care delivered to patients with financial support from the APM.

***

(b) Payment based on quality measures.

(1) To be a Qualified APM, an APM must ensure that the quality of care for patients receiving services under the APM is maintained or improved.

***

(c) Financial risk.  To be a Qualified APM, an APM must either meet both the financial risk standard and nominal risk standard described in this section or be an expanded Medical Home Model as described in paragraph (c)(5) of this section. 

(1) Financial risk standard.  To be a Qualified APM, an APM must, based on whether an APM Entity’s actual expenditures for which the APM Entity is responsible under the APM exceed expected expenditures during a specified performance period, do one or more of the following:

(i) Withhold payment for services to the APM Entity or the APM Entity’s eligible clinicians;

(ii) Reduce payment rates to the APM Entity or the APM Entity’s eligible clinicians;

(iii) Require the APM Entity to owe payment(s) to CMS; or

(iv) Cause the APM Entity to lose the right to all or part of an otherwise guaranteed payment or payments.

(2) Nominal amount standard.  To be a Qualified APM, either:

(i)  the minimum total annual amount that an APM Entity must potentially owe or forego under the APM must be at least 4 percent of the APM Entity’s total Medicare Parts A and B revenue, or

(ii) the APM entity must document that (a) it is using its own resources to deliver new or expanded services to beneficiaries that are not directly paid for by Medicare and (b) the amount of those resources are equal to or greater than 4% of the APM Entity’s total Medicare Parts A and B revenues.

(3) Expected expenditures. For the purposes of this section, expected expenditures is defined as either:

(i)  the payment to the APM entity, if the APM entity will be responsible for paying for all of the services to be delivered under the APM, or

(ii) the spending target established under the APM for the total spending on all of the services to which the APM applies.

(4) Capitation. A full capitation arrangement meets this Qualified APM criterion. For purposes of this subpart, a capitation arrangement means a payment arrangement in which a per capita or otherwise predetermined payment is made to an APM Entity for all items and services furnished to a population of beneficiaries, and no settlement is performed to reconcile or share losses incurred or savings earned by the APM Entity. Arrangements made between CMS and Medicare Advantage Organizations under the Medicare Advantage program (42 U.S.C. section 422) are not considered capitation arrangements for purposes of this paragraph (c)(4).

(5) Medical Home Model Expanded under section 1115A(c) of the Act.  A Medical Home Model that has been expanded under section 1115A(c) of the Act meets the financial risk criterion under this section.

 

Additional recommendations for changes in the proposed MACRA regulations are included in the Center for Healthcare Quality and Payment Reform’s formal comment letter to CMS on the proposed MACRA regulations, which can be downloaded here.

These changes to the regulations are necessary but not sufficient to accelerate the development and implementation of APMs.  CMS also needs to significantly change the current process it uses to implement APMs, which is far too slow and burdensome.  Recommendations for this are included in CHQPR’s comment letter to CMS and will be described in a future message.

 

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Wednesday, May 11, 2016

Why the CMS Part B Drug Payment Demo Could Hurt Cancer Patients and What Should Replace It

Cancer treatment is becoming less and less affordable every year.  The primary reason for the rapid increase in cancer treatment costs is the increasingly high prices manufacturers charge for the drugs cancer patients need.  However, instead of finding ways to reduce the high prices of drugs, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has proposed to cut the Medicare payments that enable oncology practices to buy and use the drugs cancer patients need.

CMS believes that the current method it uses to pay physicians to administer drugs in their offices creates a “financial incentive to prescribe high cost drugs over lower cost ones when comparable low cost drugs are available.”  To address this, it proposed the “Part B Drug Payment Model” in March 2016.  If it were implemented, this mandatory demonstration would cut Medicare payments to physicians for all of the drugs they administer (regardless of whether there are lower-cost drugs available) in order to “test” whether this would lead to a reduction in Medicare spending on drugs.  Although the change is represented as being budget neutral for physician practices overall, data presented by CMS indicate that the change would actually cut payments to oncology practices by over $32 million.

Many individuals and organizations have expressed strong opposition to the proposal, while others have supported it.  However, it is difficult to determine whether to support or oppose the proposal without understanding the complex way that Medicare pays for physician-administered drugs.  As explained in detail below, once you understand how payment works today, it becomes clear that the most likely effect of the change proposed by CMS will be to make it more difficult for cancer patients to obtain the drugs they need.  Moreover, it also becomes clear that more comprehensive reforms are needed to the way oncology practices are paid that would support improved care for patients and reduce truly avoidable spending.

Do Medicare Payments for Cancer Drugs Create Incentives to Use More Expensive Drugs?

Today, when a Medicare patient with cancer comes to an oncology practice for a chemotherapy infusion treatment, the drug the patient receives had to first be purchased by the practice from a drug wholesaler and then stored in the practice’s pharmacy until it was used to treat the patient.  After the patient receives the drug, Medicare pays the practice a predetermined amount for the drug, and by law, that amount is calculated by taking the “Average Sales Price” for the drug (ASP) six months earlier and adding 6%.  Currently, the actual payment is only ASP + 4.3% because of the across-the-board 2% cut in Medicare payments due to sequestration.

Many people have been led to believe that the 6% add-on is “profit” for the oncologist or the oncology practice.  In reality, the 6% is used by the oncology practice to cover at least five types of costs that are not otherwise reimbursed by Medicare:

  • the cost of operating the pharmacy in the oncology practice that enables drugs to be safely stored, mixed, and administered to patients;
  • the cost of wastage and breakage for drugs (although the practice must pay a drug company for the full price of a vial of chemotherapy, it can only bill Medicare for the portion of the vial that is used);
  • the difference between the “Average Sales Price” (ASP) and the actual acquisition cost of drugs (a more detailed explanation of this point is provided below);
  • the time the practice spends in trying to get financial assistance to help patients who don’t have supplemental insurance to pay the high cost-sharing on expensive drugs; and
  • the losses practices incur by not being able to collect the full cost-sharing amount from patients who cannot afford it.

Many of the above costs are higher for more expensive cancer drugs, which is why it makes sense to base the payment at least in part on a percentage of the drug price.  For example, if an oncology practice cannot use 10% of what is in a drug vial, the practice will not be reimbursed for 10% of what it paid for that drug, and a drug that was five times as expensive as another will cause the practice to lose five times as much.  Practices need to spend more time trying to help patients obtain financial assistance in paying their cost-sharing on expensive drugs than on lower-cost drugs, and practices incur more bad debt for patients receiving expensive drugs than low-cost drugs.

Contrary to what CMS and others believe, covering all of these costs and covering the higher costs associated with more expensive drugs does not create an “incentive” for a practice to use an expensive drug.  If anything, the percentage payment avoids creating a disincentive for the practice to use the expensive drug, so the oncologist can choose the drug that is best for the patient without worrying (as much) about whether the practice will lose money by using the drug.

No one knows what the “right” payment amount is to cover all of these costs.  The current 6% statutory amount is not based on an analysis showing that amount would cover the costs physician practices in general or oncology practices in particular incur, and CMS has not presented any new analysis indicating that 6% is too much.  In the Part B Drug Payment Model, CMS has proposed replacing the ASP+ 6% formula with a three part formula: ASP + 2.5% + a $16.80 flat payment per drug.  (With the sequestration adjustment, the actual payment would only be ASP + 0.86% + $16.53.)  However, CMS presented no analysis justifying that 2.5% would better match costs than 6%.  It used that amount because it was used by the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) in an analysis MedPAC did.  MedPAC used the 2.5% amount in its analysis because it felt that this “should be sufficient to cover markups from wholesalers.”  CMS indicates that this was based on “anecdotal evidence” that such markups are between 1% and 2%, but that MedPAC “was not aware of data that could verify this estimate.” CMS states in its regulation that it is “not aware of data that could verify this assessment.”

Rather than seeking to obtain better data to determine what the right percentage should be, CMS is proposing to just cut the amount from 6% to 2.5% and see what happens.  The $16.80 flat payment was selected by CMS in order to offset the loss in revenue caused by the cut from 6% to 2.5%.  However, the analysis presented by CMS only shows that adding a $16.80 flat payment would offset the cut from 6% to 2.5% on average in 2014; the analysis shows that some types of physician practices – particularly oncologists, rheumatologists, and ophthalmologists – would experience large cuts in revenue, while other physician practices, such as primary care physicians, orthopedic surgeons, and cardiologists, would experience large increases in revenue.  No analysis is presented to suggest that these increases and cuts in revenue for different specialties would better match the costs the physicians in those specialties are incurring to deliver medications to their patients.

Some combination of a flat fee and a percentage markup would probably be a better match for a practice’s costs than a pure percentage-based markup, because a pure percentage markup under-reimburses pharmacy operations costs when lower-priced drugs are used (since there are fixed costs to operate the pharmacy that have to be covered regardless of the price of the drugs used), but a flat fee alone wouldn’t cover the higher costs the practice incurs when it uses more expensive drugs (because, as explained earlier, the practice’s costs are higher for higher-priced drugs).  However, the specific combination of a flat fee and percentage that CMS is proposing would clearly not be a better match for an oncology practice’s costs than the current percentage payment, because CMS’s own calculations show the proposed formula would result in a more than $30 million cut in the payments that oncology practices currently use to cover the costs of operating their pharmacies and purchasing the drugs their patients need.  Moreover, measuring whether the total payments are higher or lower than they are currently begs the question of whether the payment amounts were correct to begin with.

Available data indicate that commercial health plans pay a higher percentage markup on drugs than Medicare does, not a lower markup as CMS is proposing.  Some of these higher percentage markups likely do exceed the costs cited earlier that are associated with purchasing, storing, and administering drugs to patients.  However, data show that these higher payments do not represent “profits” to oncologists or to their practices; rather, these higher payments cover the costs of services that oncology practices deliver to their patients that are not paid for, or are inadequately paid for, by Medicare and the commercial health plans, such as the costs of patient education and counseling services, the time spent in coordinating care, etc.  Data from the National Practice Benchmark for Oncology indicate that current fee-for-service payments from Medicare and other payers only cover 2/3 of the costs of the services that oncology practices provide to their patients.  Many oncology practices are forced to rely on higher commercial payments for drugs to subsidize the other services they offer.

However, focusing only on the small percentage markup ignores the serious problems with the ASP portion of the formula, which represents 96% of Medicare’s spending on drugs and 96% of what the practice receives to cover the costs of acquiring drugs.  Most people do not realize that Medicare does not reimburse a practice for its actual acquisition cost associated with an expensive chemotherapy drug.  Rather, Medicare pays the practice based on the “average sales price” (ASP) of that drug two calendar quarters earlier.  As everyone knows, the prices of most cancer drugs are increasing rapidly.  This means that in most cases, the ASP payment from Medicare will be less than what the oncology practice will have to pay to purchase the drug, because the ASP amount was based on the price of the drug six months earlier, not the price when the practice actually bought the drug.  There are also concerns that the formula calculating ASP incorporates discounts received by wholesalers that are not actually passed on to physician practices, which means that the ASP amount is less than the average amount that physician practices actually paid for a drug.  Moreover, because larger practices often can obtain discounts that smaller practices cannot, smaller practices will generally have to pay more for a drug than larger practices, and that means they will pay more for a drug than what is calculated as the “average sales price.”  Consequently, when Medicare bases payments on ASP, it is often paying less than a practice’s actual acquisition cost for drugs, particularly for small practices.

The result of this very complex system is that many oncology practices, particularly small practices, lose money on many of the chemotherapy drugs they purchase.  Medicare’s 6% add-on payment (which has been only 4.3% under sequestration) on top of ASP helps to offset this loss in some cases, but not all.  The CMS proposal to significantly cut that add-on payment will mean that practices will lose money on even more drugs than they do today.  CMS is not proposing any improvements to the ASP system – which represents 96% of the payment for drugs – to make it more accurate or to remove any undesirable incentives it might create, it is only proposing to change the remaining 4% and to do so without any solid analysis indicating that the new amount better matches costs than does the current amount.

If CMS does not pay adequately to cover the losses and costs oncology practices incur in buying and administering chemotherapy, oncology practices will not be able to afford to administer the drugs patients need.  This will affect their ability to administer the lower-priced drugs CMS wants to encourage practices to use as well as their ability to use expensive drugs.

As noted earlier, paying adequately for the costs of administering chemotherapy does not give an oncologist an “incentive” to use one drug over another.  Rather, it ensures the oncology practice is not penalized financially for choosing the most appropriate drugs for their patients.  Moreover, for many patients, there may be only one drug that is appropriate to treat their disease at a particular point in time, in which case there is no choice that could possibly be “incentivized” by how much CMS pays for drugs.  In these cases, the proposal by CMS to cut drug payments would simply create a financial penalty for oncology practices when their patients need a high-cost drug or a drug whose price has been increasing rapidly.

The bottom line is there are two primary types of impacts that would be likely to occur if CMS implements the Part B Drug Payment Model.  One is that cancer patients will be unable to receive chemotherapy treatments that they need because their oncologists can no longer afford to purchase and administer them.  The second is that community oncology practices that try to purchase the drugs their patients need with inadequate reimbursement from Medicare will lose money and potentially be forced to close, and that in turn will mean that patients will have to travel farther and pay more to obtain cancer treatments.  It would be inappropriate for CMS to use the authority provided under the Affordable Care Act to “test” which of these impacts will occur or how big the impacts would be.

How to Control Cancer Spending Without Harming Patients

Instead of this problematic proposal, CMS should pursue implementation of comprehensive oncology payment reforms that will actually improve care for patients while making that care more affordable.  Last year, after many months of work, the American Society of Clinical Oncology (ASCO) announced a proposal for comprehensive payment reform called Patient-Centered Oncology Payment (PCOP).  PCOP is designed to provide adequate payment to oncology practices for many essential services that Medicare and health plans don’t pay for today, such as patient education, counseling, care coordination, etc.  Under PCOP, instead of oncology practices being forced to try and pay for essential patient services using revenues generated from drugs, the practices would be paid directly for those services.  PCOP is also specifically designed to reduce the overall cost of cancer care by (a) identifying the kinds of drugs, tests, and treatments that patients do not need and reduce the use of those services and (b) reducing the rates of complications and hospitalizations that patients experience while undergoing cancer treatment.  Under PCOP, oncology practices would take responsibility for implementing evidence-based guidelines developed by ASCO for prescribing tests and drugs, and the practices would receive payments enabling them to determine an accurate diagnosis and to select the most appropriate treatment based on the guidelines.  This would improve care for patients and make care more affordable, rather than achieving savings at the expense of quality.

Although PCOP has many advantages over the current payment system for oncology, it has specific advantages compared to the CMS Part B Drug Payment Model.  Instead of a policy that tries to discourage oncology practices from using expensive drugs that patients need, as the CMS Part B Drug Payment Model would do, Patient-Centered Oncology Payment would discourage practices from using drugs when patients don’t really need them.  Since many of those drugs are very expensive, this would save money without harming patients.

For example, the data that CMS released in conjunction with its Part B Drug Payment Model proposal showed that Medicare spent over $1 billion in 2014 on a very expensive drug called pegfilgrastim, the fourth highest amount Medicare spent on any drug in the Part B program.  Pegfilgrastim is not used to treat cancer, but rather to help patients who are receiving chemotherapy to avoid developing infections.  ASCO has developed guidelines for when the drug should and should not be used, but studies have shown that pegfilgrastim is being used for many patients who do not really need it.  The drug isn’t being overused because oncology practices have a financial incentive to do so, it’s being overused because oncologists want to help as many patients as possible avoid complications that can lead to hospitalizations.  However, not all types of chemotherapy are equally likely to cause the kinds of complications that pegfilgrastim can prevent, and the drug causes serious side effects that can outweigh its benefits for many patients.  Rather than simply cutting all payments for pegfilgrastim whether patients would benefit from it or not (as the proposed Part B Drug Payment Model would do), PCOP would enable an oncology practice to have adequate time to determine which patients really need the drug and also pay for the staff resources needed to create more cost-effective approaches for preventing hospitalizations for the others.

Reducing unnecessary spending on a few frequently used, expensive drugs could result in far greater savings for Medicare than anything the proposed Part B Drug Payment Model could achieve.  The PCOP payment model would provide oncology practices the time and resources they need in order to implement and follow complex, evidence-based guidelines that can control spending while protecting patients.

Reducing avoidable spending on drugs and tests is just one way that PCOP would achieve savings on cancer care in ways that benefit patients.  Another major focus of PCOP would be to enable cancer physicians to turn their practices into “oncology medical homes,” including providing rapid response to complications of chemotherapy in order to avoid patients being taken to the emergency room or being hospitalized.  A national demonstration project called COME HOME (www.comehomeprogram.com) that was funded by CMS showed that dramatic reductions in the frequency of ED visits and hospitalizations and overall savings for Medicare could be achieved by giving oncology practices the time and resources they need to deliver more services to patients.  Unfortunately, these services are not paid for under the current Medicare fee schedule, and the practices that have implemented these services will have to discontinue them if a better payment system like PCOP isn’t implemented soon.

CMS has developed another oncology payment reform demonstration called the Oncology Care Model that could provide some of the resources oncology practices need to help their patients avoid ED visits and hospitalizations.  Unfortunately, the Oncology Care Model would also create significant financial incentives for oncology practices to give patients low-cost drugs regardless of whether those drugs would be effective for their patients, and it would penalize practices by dropping them from the program if they don’t find ways to reduce spending on drugs and other services.  A report prepared by the Center for Healthcare Quality and Payment Reform titled A Better Way to Pay for Cancer Care explains why the PCOP payment model is superior to the Oncology Care Model and to other alternative payment models that have been proposed or used by CMS.  It is available at http://www.chqpr.org/cancer-care.html.

The current payment system for oncology care in America is badly broken.  Cancer patients deserve much better.  There are significant opportunities to reduce the cost of cancer care in ways that help patients rather than hurt them, but these can only be implemented with an appropriately designed payment system that provides adequate funding for good cancer care grounded in evidence-based guidelines for treatment.  Rather than testing problematic and piecemeal payment “incentives” that could seriously harm both patients and oncology practices, CMS should implement a truly comprehensive payment reform that strengthens oncology practices and enables them to deliver the best possible care to patients at the most affordable cost.

 

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Saturday, January 23, 2016

Will Federal Policies Accelerate or Impede Progress in Payment Reform?

Despite widespread agreement on the need for major improvements in healthcare payment systems, progress in implementing truly meaningful payment reforms has been frustratingly slow.  Last spring, as part of the Medicare and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA), Congress created significant new incentives and processes designed to dramatically accelerate progress in payment reform, with a focus on creating better ways to pay physicians.

The success of MACRA will depend heavily on how the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) implement the provisions of the law relating to Alternative Payment Models (APMs) and Physician-Focused Payment Models.  The decisions they make and the processes they establish could either encourage rapid development and implementation of innovative and successful payment models, or deter innovation and impede the progress in payment reform that Congress wanted to support.

A new report from the Center for Healthcare Quality and Payment Reform, Implementing Alternative Payment Models Under MACRA: How the Federal Government Can Accelerate Successful Health Care Payment Reform, explains the provisions of MACRA relating to APMs and describes the actions HHS and CMS should take in three key areas:

  • The regulations defining Alternative Payment Models and alternative payment entities;
  • The processes for soliciting, reviewing, and approving Physician-Focused Payment Models; and
  • The systems and resources to implement Physician-Focused Alternative Payment Models

A copy of the report can be downloaded at:
www.CHQPR.org/downloads/ImplementingAPMsUnderMACRA.pdf

The important issues discussed in the report include:

  • The level of financial risk that physicians should be required to accept under Alternative Payment Models;
  • The steps the new Congressionally-created Physician-Focused Payment Model Technical Advisory Committee and HHS should take to encourage the development of innovative APMs for physicians;
  • The dramatic changes that CMS will need to make in its approach to implementing payment reforms in order for every physician to have the ability to participate in one or more desirable APMs by the Congressionally-mandated deadline of 2019.

Implementing Alternative Payment Models Under MACRA explains why the Alternative Payment Models that are being designed and implemented by CMS and the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI) not only fail to solve the problems with current payment systems but can actually make it harder for physicians who want to improve care and reduce spending.  The report details the serious problems with the approaches CMS and CMMI are using in most of their payment models, and it explains the types of payment changes that should be used instead, including seven different types of Physician-Focused Alternative Payment Models that could improve patient care and reduce spending for Medicare while preserving the financial viability of high-quality physician practices and other healthcare providers.  The report also describes how the development of new patient condition groups, care episode groups, and patient relationship groups required by MACRA can facilitate the development of better Alternative Payment Models.

Additional information on how to develop successful Alternative Payment Models can be obtained in these earlier reports from the Center for Healthcare Quality and Payment Reform, all of which can be downloaded free of charge at www.CHQPR.org:

  • A Guide to Physician-Focused Alternative Payment Models (produced in collaboration with the American Medical Association), which describes seven different types of Alternative Payment Models in detail, with examples of their application in a wide range of medical specialties;
  • The Building Blocks of Successful Payment Reform, which describes the four essential components of any successful APM and explains the different ways in which they can be designed to match the structure and capabilities of different physician practices and other providers;
  • Making the Business Case for Payment and Delivery Reform, which provides a step-by-step process for designing a payment model and setting the payment amounts and accountability targets in ways that can improve care for patients and reduce spending for payers in ways that are financially feasible for providers; and
  • Measuring and Assigning Accountability for Healthcare Spending, which describes the problems with most current “value-based purchasing” and shared savings programs and explains how to design payment models that only hold physicians and other providers accountable for the aspects of costs that they can control or influence.
 

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Friday, September 11, 2015

Doctors and Hospitals Agree: Medicare is Changing Payments the Wrong Way

Doctors and hospitals both agree that there are serious problems with the way the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) is designing new healthcare payment models.  The American Medical Association (AMA) and the American Hospital Association both submitted detailed criticisms of the Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement Payment Model that CMS proposed in July.  (The comments submitted by the AMA can be downloaded here and the comments submitted by the AHA can be downloaded here.)  Both groups provide a long list of problems with the CMS proposal, many of which are similar to those in CHQPR’s report Bundling Better.  The AMA and AHA criticisms include:
  • The lack of risk adjustment in episode budgets.  The AHA provides data showing the large differences in the types and cost of rehabilitation services needed by joint replacement patients depending on their age and health status, yet CMS is proposing to make the same payments for everyone.
  • The lack of flexibility to change the way individual providers are paid.  The AMA describes the problems with the severe restrictions CMS places on how payments can be divided among participating providers.  The AHA gives an example of how, because Inpatient Rehabilitation Facilities (IRF) could only be paid using the current fixed case rates defined by CMS, a hospital might be forced to send a patient to a skilled nursing facility instead of an IRF because of the different way the two facilities are paid, rather than what is best for the patient.
  • The excessive amount of risk shifted to hospitals.  The AHA estimates that the payments hospitals currently receive for joint surgery could be cut by over one-third through this program in order to pay for the costs of post-acute care if the CMS payment rates turn out to be too low.
What is really significant is that neither the AMA nor the AHA is asking CMS to preserve the status quo.  Indeed, rather than merely criticizing problems with the CMS proposal, the AHA provides a lengthy list of recommended improvements, and the AMA provides a detailed blueprint for a completely different approach to paying for comprehensive care for joint replacement.  Key elements of the approach recommended by the AMA, which could be a model for episode payments in other areas, are:
  • Patients who need surgery should have the opportunity to choose physician-led teams of providers (hospitals, post-acute care providers, etc.) who have organized themselves to coordinate services and take accountability for cost and outcomes for the entire episode of care, including preparation for surgery, the surgery itself, the rehabilitation after surgery, and any complications that arise.
  • The provider teams should receive a bundled payment that gives them both sufficient resources to achieve good outcomes for their patients and the flexibility to design services in a way that achieves the best outcome at the lowest cost.  The provider teams should also have the flexibility to create new organizational arrangements or use existing organizations to receive bundled payments and the flexibility to allocate those payments among the participating providers.
  • Payment amounts should be risk-adjusted so that patients with greater needs can receive adequate services, and outlier payments and risk corridors should be established that protect providers from excessive risk.  Payment amounts should be higher for providers with better outcomes, and payments should be stable and predictable over time.
In addition to its detailed recommendations for a better way to pay for joint replacement, the AMA recommended seven goals for how CMS should approach the development of alternative payment models.  These goals could serve as guiding principles for all payment reform efforts by both Medicare and private payers:
  1. Remove the barriers to better care that are created by current payment systems.  A major reason why payment reform is needed is that current payment systems create barriers to delivering the kind of care that will improve quality and reduce costs.  The AMA states that many physicians have identified ways of improving quality and cost, but they cannot implement those changes unless the barriers in the current payment system are removed.  CMS and other payers won’t fix these problems by merely adding small “incentives” on top of a broken payment system.
  2. Provide adequate, predictable resources to support delivery of high-value care.  The AMA emphasizes that if savings are achieved by setting payment rates below achievable costs, physicians, hospitals, and other providers could be forced out of business and Medicare patients would face reduced access to care.  Instead of requiring across-the-board “discounts” for all providers, CMS should give providers the ability to eliminate avoidable spending and then set bundled payment rates based on what they show can be achieved.
  3. Hold physicians and other providers accountable only for aspects of cost and quality they can influence or control.  The AMA clearly states that physicians are willing to accept accountability for the aspects of quality and cost they can control or influence.  However, all of the payment models CMS has been developing put physicians at risk for spending over which they have no control.  This prevents many physicians from participating in these payment models and slows national progress in controlling costs and improving quality.
  4. Allow voluntary participation by providers in all parts of the country.  Hundreds of physician groups, hospitals, and other providers are already participating in the various payment programs CMS has created, and hundreds more would have participated if various flaws in those programs had been corrected.  The way to get broader participation and make faster progress in payment reform is not to mandate problematic payment models, but to provide the support innovators say they need.
  5. Support physician leadership in redesigning care delivery.  As the AMA points out, payment models don’t create higher quality care at lower cost, physicians and other health professionals do.  The determination as to what types of care could effectively improve a patient’s needs must be made by physicians and patients, not by payers.  If physicians have indicated that they can and will improve care and reduce costs, then payment models should be designed to provide the flexibility they need and the accountability they are able and willing to accept.
  6. Allow flexibility for different organizational arrangements among providers.  There are enormous differences in the ways healthcare services are organized and delivered in different parts of the country.  No one-size-fits-all approach to payment reform will work well in all parts of the country, no matter how efficient it would be for a federal agency or other national payer to have a single approach.  CMS deserves considerable praise for the way it designed its Bundled Payments for Care Improvement initiative because it offered four different payment models, not just one, it gave providers the flexibility to choose which of 48 different types of patient conditions they wanted to focus on, and it provided multiple choices for organizational structures and risk arrangements.  That one federal program has provided more different payment reform models than any private payer in the country.  CMS needs to design future payment reform programs with similar or greater flexibility, not less.
  7. Design payment reforms through a collaborative approach.  The fact that doctors and hospitals have so many serious concerns about the CMS proposal clearly indicates that CMS needs a more effective process for engaging healthcare providers in the development of good payment models.  The enormous amount of time and effort that CMS obviously invested in developing the CCJR proposal would have produced a much better result if CMS had involved physicians, hospitals, and other healthcare providers in the process from the very early stages, rather than seeking input only through comments on a several hundred page regulation that many people will perceive as a fait accompli.  Instead of viewing providers as adversaries in a regulatory process, CMS needs to develop new payment models through a more collaborative approach.  In many parts of the country, providers and payers are working together through multi-stakeholder Regional Health Improvement Collaboratives to redesign payment and delivery systems in a “win-win-win” way, and CMS should support that same kind of multi-stakeholder collaboration in its work.

 

 

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